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DAMNED IF YOU DO, DAMNED IF YOU
DON’T: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF
CO-EMPLOYEE LIABILITY AND WYOMING
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SUBROGATION
Jason Johnson and Christopher M. Brennan*
“That the history and evolution of co-employee liability is fraught
with complexities and idiosyncrasies that are not readily parsed
is a matter well-known to this Court.”1
Workers’ Compensation is a relatively new concept, having its origins in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.2 With industry developing rapidly during the
1800s, society began to realize tort law was not fit to handle workplace injuries.3
Injured workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries experienced
frequent court losses due to common negligence defenses used by employers:
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant rule.4
Further, employers were concerned about juries allowing their sympathy for
injured workers to cloud their judgment.5 “Eventually, cases involving severe
injuries, in circumstances suggesting employer callousness, made their way to
judges and juries not instinctively sympathetic to employers’ interests.”6 Thus,
“The Societal Deal” was born:

* Associate Attorneys, Romsa Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, WY, (307) 433-8777.
Hannifan v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 2008 WY 65, ¶ 5, 185 P.3d 679, 682 (Wyo. 2008) (the
“complexities and idiosyncrasies” only get worse when subrogation is added into the mix).
1

Michael C. Duff, Workers’ Compensation Law: A Context and Practice Casebook 6
(1st ed. 2013).
2

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

See id.

6

Id.
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upon suffering a workplace injury, a worker would be paid a cash
benefit amounting to a proportion (often 2/3) of the workers’
average pre-injury weekly wage. The cash benefit would in theory
be continued for as long as the injury contributed to the worker’s
incapacity for work. The worker would also be compensated for
medical treatment made necessary by the injury. Recovery of
statutory benefits would be the workers’ exclusive remedy.7
Wyoming adopted its version of “The Societal Deal” in 1993.8 The statute provided:
The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee,
including any joint employee, and his dependents for injuries
incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all
other rights and remedies against any employer and any joint
employer making contributions required by this act, or their
employees acting within the scope of their employment unless
the employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury
to the injured employee, but do not supersede any rights and
remedies available to an employee and his dependents against
any other person.9
Today, the statute remains largely unchanged, but confusion surrounds its meaning
and questions presented to the Wyoming Supreme Court continue to grow.10
This article will first provide a contextual analysis of Wyoming co-employee
liability law and its requirements.11 Second, this article will discuss the difficulties
presented to an employee attempting to collect monies owed to him.12 This article
will then uncover the confusion and intricacy behind the Wyoming Workers’
Compensation subrogation system, particularly as it pertains to co-employee
liability and third-party liability.13 Finally, this article will provide an interpretive
framework complete with alternative solutions to the problematic subrogation
system found in Wyoming Statute section 27-14-105 as it pertains to co-employee

Id. (emphasis added). “It has become a firm general rule that a work related injury may not
be the subject of a tort suit. This is known as the exclusive remedy rule.” Id. at 7.
7

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (1993). As discussed, Wyoming struggled in
defining the extent of the exclusive remedy rule, which lead to strenuous litigation and a question
of constitutionality. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text; supra notes 9–10 and accom
panying text.
8

9

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a).

10

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (2015).

11

See infra Part I.

12

See infra Part II.

13

See infra Part III.
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liability and third-party liability, with the hopes of providing a workable solution
to this confusing and often frustrating law.14

I. Providing Some Context: The Facts of Our Case
Because the theory presented in this article is difficult to discuss in the
abstract, an example will provide the context needed to set the stage for both the
discussion and argument that follow.

A. Example 1: Workers’ Compensation Third-Party Liability Action with
Subrogation and Co-Employee Negligence
Peter was a road paver working for a local contracting business, Road Repair,
LLC. One day, Peter was driving the paver, attempting to pave a section of the
well-maintained Interstate 80 (I-80). Chad, another employee of Road Repair,
LLC, was responsible for slowing vehicles as Peter paved the road. The process of
slowing vehicles involved standing on the side of the construction site, warning
on-coming traffic of the road repair and the requirement to reduce speed ahead.
Instead of warning oncoming vehicles, Chad was fraternizing with a female
employee. Meanwhile, Darryl, a trucker for Trucking Industries, LLC, was driving
on I-80 at breakneck speed. He came upon the beginning of the construction
zone and slowed to forty-five miles per hour. The construction zone was properly
labeled and the speed limit was posted at thirty miles per hour. Darryl drove
past the point where Chad was supposed to warn drivers of the paver. At the
same time, Peter began backing up into oncoming traffic without looking. At
that moment, Darryl and Peter collided. Peter suffered a cervical neck injury and
a fractured arm. Darryl walked away unscathed, and Chad was dateless that night,
despite his best efforts. Workers’ Compensation paid Peter $400,000.00 in total
benefits, so that is the amount of Workers’ Compensation’s subrogation lien.15
Peter brought a co-employee liability claim against Chad and a negligence claim
against Trucking Industries, LLC.

Outcome 1
Peter’s case went to a jury trial. The jury awarded total damages of $900,000.00:
including $300,000.00 for medical costs and lost wages, $100,000.00 in future
medicals bills, and $500,000.00 for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life,
and permanent disability.

14

See infra Part IV, V.

These include medical care payments, temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial
disability, among others. See Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules of the Wyoming Workers’
Compensation Division, Chapter 5, § 4; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-401 to -408 (2015).
For a definition of the foregoing terms, see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102 (2015).
15
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The jury apportioned fault as follows:
Darryl:
Chad:
Peter:

50% (or $450,000.00)
50% (judgment proof )
0%

Outcome 2
Peter and Trucking Industries, LLC’s insurance company negotiated for
several years. Eventually, knowing the risks that a jury could apportion fault in
any number of ways, Trucking Industries, LLC’s insurance company agreed to
settle the case with Peter for $450,000.00. Workers’ Compensation agreed to
the settlement.

B. Example 2: A Personal Injury Stemming from a Car Accident with Two
Liable Defendants
To better show the discrepancies in normal third-party subrogation claims and
Workers’ Compensation claims, imagine a car accident involving three vehicles.
On an icy day in January, Bill (employee) was driving his car when he was hit
from behind by Jim (co-employee). While they waited for the police to show
up, Betty (third-party) saw Jim and Bill sitting at the intersection. Though Betty
applied her brakes, she was unable to stop because of the ice and slammed into
Bill, who subsequently hit Jim again. Bill eventually required medical treatment.
Bill’s and Jim’s insurance company was Rancher’s Insurance, and Betty’s insurance
company was The Colonel.
In this example, Bill’s medical treatment will be covered initially by the
medical payment coverage under his own vehicle insurance plan. However, his
insurer, Rancher’s Insurance, is entitled to subrogation if Bill decides to bring suit
against Jim and Betty.16 Of course, fault must be allocated.17 Bill is not restricted
because his insurance company is the same as Jim’s. This is a stark difference
from the traditional Workers’ Compensation system, especially when Workers’
Compensation is nothing more than workplace insurance.18 This is an example of
how a plaintiff, in a case outside the realm of Workers’ Compensation, can claim
against two wrongdoers and how subrogation is handled in those situations. Now
that the readers have a good idea of how a typical third-party claim is handled
outside of the realm of Workers’ Compensation, it would be prudent to delve into
the complexities when Workers’ Compensation is inserted into the equation.

16

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-10-104 (2015).

17

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(e) (2015).

18

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-104; see also Duff, supra note 2, at 349.
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II. Co-Employee Liability and the
Wyoming Workers’ Compensation System
A. The History of Co-Employee Liability is Fraught with
Constitutional Idiosyncrasies
As stated above, the exclusive remedy rule provides immunity for employers
who pay their premiums to the Workers’ Compensation system.19 In 1974,
the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the common law doctrine holding that
co-employees could be liable when their own negligence caused injury to other
employees.20 Perhaps realizing the Wyoming Supreme Court had potentially
opened the floodgates, in 1975 the legislature limited the scope by providing
co-employees with immunity when they were “acting within the scope of their
employment unless the employees [were] grossly negligent.”21 The term “grossly
negligent” was changed in 1977 to “culpably negligent.”22 By taking a giant step
back, gouging employees’ rights and remedies, the Wyoming legislature abrogated
co-employee claims and, instead, provided for total immunity of co-employees
who acted within the scope of their employment.23 Although it took six years,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional in violation of
the Wyoming Equal Protection Clause.24 Thus, Wyoming’s current co-employee
liability law was born.
19

See Wyo. Const. art. X, § 4; see also supra notes 2–10 and accompanying text.

See Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 624 (Wyo. 1974), superseded by statute, Wyoming
Worker’s Compensation Act, 1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 1, as recognized in Cottonwood Steel
Corp. v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226 (Wyo. 1982).
20

21

1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 1 (emphasis added).

22

1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 142, § 1.

23

See 1986 Wyo. Sp. Sess. Laws ch. 3, § 3. In 1986, Wyoming Statute section 27-14-104(a) read:
The rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee and his dependents
for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights
and remedies against any employer making contributions required by this act, or
his employees acting within the scope of their employment, but do not supersede
any rights and remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any
other person.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (1986).
24

See Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 54 (Wyo. 1992). The court specifically held:
[W]e do not perceive that complete immunity for co-employees who were acting
within the scope of their employment was the least onerous means by which
the objective of the Act could be achieved. Section 27-14-104(a) precluded
employees from bringing suit against co-employees who committed intentional
torts while they were acting within the scope of their employment. In essence,
that provision permits an employee to intentionally harm a co-employee without
being concerned about civil liability. While such immunity may slightly decrease
the number of lawsuits filed by employees and increase the number of employees
who will be guaranteed compensation, it severely burdens the State’s undeniable
interest in prohibiting an individual from committing an intentional tort without
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With Wyoming’s Workers’ Compensation system providing a cloak of
immunity for employers, it is often difficult for injured employees to collect
compensation for their injuries. Although Mills v. Reynolds provided that
co-employees can be held liable for their actions, the Wyoming Supreme Court
has raised the bar for injured employees to obtain co-employee compensation.25
The law in Wyoming requires the injured worker to meet an extremely high
standard to collect from a co-employee.26 Wyoming Statute section 27-14-104(a)
provides the all too important exclusive remedy rule.27 Reading this statute, it
is difficult to determine exactly when an employee is legally liable to another
employee. Although the statute requires that an employee “intentionally act to
cause physical harm or injury to the inured employee,”28 the Wyoming Supreme
Court has struggled to define what constitutes an intentional act.29

B. Developing a Concise Framework for Co-Employee Liability:
Bertagnolli v. Louderback
Although the requirements of co-employee liability have been addressed
previously, no case has put them as succinctly as Bertagnolli v. Louderback. On
November 13, 1996, a mine foreman instructed Joe Bertagnolli, a mine worker,
to shovel ore in the west end of the shuttle belt area of the mine.30 Bertagnolli
requested the shuttle belt be “locked out” so it could not be turned on while he
was shoveling.31 The shift supervisors discussed the issue and told Bertagnolli the

the possibility of liability. Harmony in the work place may actually be enhanced
if an employee knows that the worker next to him will be legally accountable
for some of his actions, and, even though the parties have not presented facts
concerning insurance costs and the financial status of the workers’ compensation
fund, we would be hard pressed to hold that those objectives could be attained
only under a scheme which provided complete immunity to employees.
Id. at 55 (citations omitted); see also Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, ¶ 14, 67 P.3d 627,
631–32 (Wyo. 2003).
25

See Bertagnolli, ¶ 16, 67 P.3d at 633.

26

Id.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (2015) (“The rights and remedies provided in this
act for an employee . . . are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer . . . making
contributions required by this act . . . .” (emphasis added)).
27

28

Id.

See, e.g., Bertagnolli, 2003 WY 50, 67 P.3d 627; Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989);
Loredo v. Solvay Am. Inc., 2009 WY 93, 212 P.3d 614 (Wyo. 2009); Smith v. Throckmartin, 893
P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1995).
29

See Bertagnolli, ¶ 5, 67 P.3d at 629 (“The shuttle belt moves raw ore from the level of the
mine on which mining occurs to lower levels. It resembles an open rail car, with a long, continuous
belt on top and travels up and down a track . . . by means of a steel cable attached to both ends of
the car. The cable makes a large loop around several pulley wheels called ‘sheave wheels.’”).
30

31

Id. ¶ 6, 67 P.3d at 630.
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belt would not be locked out.32 Bertagnolli objected and was told if he did not
do the job, he would be fired.33 While shoveling the ore approximately five feet
behind the rail car, the car started to move towards him; he attempted to get
out of the way, but his foot was caught in a pinch point between a cable and the
sheave wheel.34 The wheel severed the back portion of Bertagnolli’s foot.35
Bertagnolli filed a lawsuit against his supervisors under Wyoming Statute
section 27-14-104(a), alleging the supervisors willfully, wantonly, and intentionally
ordered him to work near active equipment known to cause amputation and death.36
The supervisors claimed they did not know the sheave wheel was unguarded, and,
thus, they could not have intentionally caused Bertagnolli’s injury.37 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the supervisors.38 On review, the
Wyoming Supreme Court reversed.39
The court clarified the history of co-employee liability law and its relationship
with the Workers’ Compensation system.40 Accepting Bertagnolli’s argument,
the court proffered the following three factors for finding co-employee liability:
“(1) knowledge of the hazard or serious nature of the risk involved, (2) responsibility
for the injured employee’s safety and work conditions, and (3) willful disregard of
the need to act despite the awareness of the high probability that serious injury or
death may result.”41 The court made specific note of the supervisors’ knowledge
of the dangers surrounding the shuttle belt.42 Moreover, the court stated that the
narrow issue of whether the sheave wheel was unguarded ignored the general risks
of working in the shuttle belt area and further ignored the dangers of working
around an active shuttle belt.43

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. ¶ 7, 67 P.3d at 630.

35

Id.

36

Id. ¶ 8, 67 P.3d at 630.

37

Id.

38

Id. ¶ 9, 67 P.3d at 630.

39

Id. ¶¶ 26–27, 67 P.3d at 635.

Id. ¶¶ 12–14, 67 P.3d at 631 (discussing the common law and statutory history of
co-employee liability).
40

41
Id. ¶ 16, 67 P.3d at 633. The court uses the word factors; however, in researching the many
cases surrounding co-employee liability, it seems that these “factors” are treated more like elements.
See, e.g., Bertagnolli, 2003 WY 50, 67 P.3d 627; Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989); Loredo v.
Solvay Am. Inc., 2009 WY 93, 212 P.3d 614 (Wyo. 2009); Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712
(Wyo. 1995).
42
See Bertagnolli, ¶ 24, 67 P.3d at 635 (“In the supervisors’ depositions, they both, albeit
reluctantly, acknowledged the extremely hazardous nature of the work done in and around the
energized shuttle belt . . . .”).
43

See id. ¶¶ 24–26, 67 P.3d at 635.
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Bertagnolli provides a very concise framework for co-employee liability.
Therefore, with this framework in mind, it would be prudent to analyze all three
requirements to gain further understanding of what must be proven to survive a
summary judgment motion.

C. Knowledge of the Hazard or Serious Nature of the Risk Involved Means
“Actual Knowledge”
The first requirement of maintaining a co-employee liability action is proving
that the responsible party had “knowledge of the hazard or the serious nature of
the risk involved.”44 In Calkins v. Boydston, Calkins worked as an operator for
Boydston and Franzen, which performs well service work for oil companies.45 On
February 8, 1986, Calkins was oiling a running pump truck when his right leg
caught the drive shaft, causing serious injury.46 Calkins presented evidence that
Boydston, the secretary-treasurer of the company, knew the pump needed to be
replaced, but Calkins never mentioned that the drive shaft was unguarded on that
particular pump truck.47 To overturn the summary judgment ruling, Calkins had
to show “that Gerald and Marinell Boydston had actual knowledge that the pump
was unguarded and that their failure to provide a guard was done willfully.”48
The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.49 In its short decision, the court announced
“[t]he case law is clear that appellant must show that the Boydstons knew of the
risk of harm or that the risk was obvious and yet they willfully disregarded the
risk. The evidence in the record fails to make such a showing.”50
Given the court’s reasoning above, a large hurdle must be overcome in order
to maintain a co-employee liability case: actual knowledge of the injury-causing
instrumentality.51 Judging by Boydston, it would be a highly contested matter to
determine whether Chad, the flagger from Example 1, had actual knowledge of
injury-causing instrumentality, i.e. the oncoming truck. Chad would argue that
he was not present at the scene, and, thus, could not have known about the
oncoming truck. However, citing to Bertagnolli, Peter would counter that Chad
44

Id. ¶ 16, 67 P.3d at 633.

45

Calkins v. Boydston, 796 P.2d 452, 453 (Wyo. 1990).

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 456 (emphasis added).

49

Id.

Id.; see also Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1362–63 (Wyo. 1981) (stating that evidence
was presented demonstrating that an employee told the defendant he was concerned for his safety
because the emergency brake on one of the vehicles did not work. The court’s finding of culpable
negligence was based on the defendant’s knowledge that the vehicle was unsafe and yet he purposely
refused to fix it.).
50

51

See Calkins, 796 P.2d. at 456.
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was disregarding the “general risks” posed by not having a flagger on the road.52
The general risks in this case are that oncoming drivers are unaware of what is
occurring ahead, will not slow down without warning, and will not exercise due
caution given the circumstances, thus increasing the risk of a serious incident.
Therefore, it seems that Peter could meet this element of the co-employee
liability test.

D. The Co-Employee Must Be Responsible for the Injured Employee’s Safety
It is not enough that a co-worker merely works with the injured employee;
the co-employee must have some level of responsibility for the injured employee’s
safety.53 Ordinarily, Wyoming law requires the employer to provide its workers
with a “reasonably safe place to work and with competent co-workers.”54 In
specifying what an employer must do, the court requires the following:
In the discharge of this duty, the employer must exercise the care
and skill that a person of ordinary prudence would observe under
the circumstances in furnishing employees with reasonably safe
machinery, appliances, tools and place to work, in keeping the
same in reasonably safe repair, and in employing competent and
sufficient employees with whom to work.55
However, the duty is not always the same. For example, the Wyoming Supreme
Court has held that in the area of extra-hazardous employment, the court requires
the employer take “every reasonable precaution suggested by experience and the
known dangers of the subject ought to be taken.”56
The Wyoming Supreme Court was presented with the issue of identifying
exactly who bears responsibility for the employee’s safety in Case v. Goss.57 Daniel
Case, a coal mine worker, was severely and permanently injured when he slipped
and fell on a hidden grease spot.58 Case sued ten co-employees.59 The major

52
See Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, ¶ 26, 67 P.3d 627, 635 (Wyo. 2003) (holding
that “the district court viewed the issues too narrowly and failed to address . . . the supervisors’
knowledge of the general risks posed by the shuttle belt.” (emphasis added)).
53

See id. ¶ 16, 67 P.3d at 633.

54

Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 192 (Wyo. 1989).

55

Id. (citing Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle Co., 550 P.2d 500, 503–04 (Wyo. 1976)).

56

Case, 776 P.2d at 192 (citing Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 535 (Wyo. 1979)).

57

See generally Case, 776 P.2d 188.

58

Id. at 190.

Id. (Case brought suit against even more co-employees, but several defendants
went unserved).
59
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issue was whether each of the co-employees owed a duty to keep Case safe.60 The
Wyoming Supreme Court dismissed Case’s suit against four co-employees from
the production department because they had no responsibility for supervision,
training, or assignment of employees in the maintenance department, including
Case.61 Because the production department’s control was, in the court’s words,
“general at best,” summary judgment in favor of the production employees was
proper.62 The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, found the safety coordinator,
among others, partially responsible for the incident.63 The court emphasized that
the safety coordinator of the mine had the duty to “establish, implement and
maintain safe working conditions and procedures at the mine to conform to state
and federal regulations . . . .”64 Because the safety coordinator was “uniquely aware
of the dangerous condition of the boom . . . and Case’s numerous complaints to
him about it,” the court found the safety coordinator responsible.65
Given the discussion set forth by the court in Case, a co-employee must
have more than a general responsibility for the injured employee’s safety.66 It is
not enough that a co-employee could have control over the injured employee,
instead there must be some level of direct responsibility for the injured employee’s
safety.67 Thus, in Example 1, we are faced with the problem of whether Chad
was generally responsible for Peter’s safety when Chad was assigned the task
of flagging down oncoming traffic. It is worth noting that the court has never
required a co-employee to be an actual supervisor to be found liable; succinctly
put, a co-employee has a general duty to avoid endangering fellow workers by
committing serious misconduct in reckless disregard of the consequences.68 In
applying the foregoing to the facts of our case, Chad has a general duty to avoid
endangering Peter. Considering the court has used the term “duty,” a negligence
element, the question becomes, did Chad act as a reasonable construction worker
in failing to do his job flagging vehicles? The answer appears to be easy: Chad

See id. at 192 (Case’s co-employees were divided among two departments, production and
maintenance. The production department operated the dragline and other equipment involved in
mining, while the maintenance department focused on repair.).
60

61

Id. at 193.

62

Id.

63

See id. at 195.

64

Id.

Id. at 196 (evidence was also presented that the safety coordinator received a maintenance
request to clean the grease spot, but the safety coordinator failed to remedy the situation, thus
supporting the court’s decision to reverse summary judgment against the safety coordinator).
65

66

Id. at 194.

67

Id.

Id. at 191 n.2 (“We do not mean to imply, however, that a co-employee must be in a
supervisory capacity in order to be found culpably negligent. [C]o-employees are subject in general
to a duty not to endanger fellow workers by engaging in serious misconduct in reckless disregard of
the consequences.”).
68
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failed to act reasonably. During his employment, he avoided doing his job, a job
critical to the safety of Peter, and instead focused on extra-curricular activities.69
Chad had more than a mere general responsibility. Chad was supposed to, in this
specific instance, ensure that Peter would be protected from oncoming vehicles.
Thus, a court would likely find this case met the “responsibility” element.

E. The Pinnacle of Determining Liability: Willful and Wanton Misconduct
Although stated differently in Bertagnolli, willful and wanton misconduct
is both the act and the intent requirement for a co-employee liability case.70
According to Wyoming Statute section 27-14-104(a), to be held liable a
co-employee must “intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured
employee.”71 The Wyoming Supreme Court has interpreted this requirement as
equivalent to “willful and wanton misconduct.”72 Before the 1993 amendment
to Wyoming Statute section 27-14-104(a), the court defined willful and wanton
misconduct as:
the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to do
an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences and under
circumstances and conditions that a reasonable person would
know, or have reason to know that such conduct would, in a
high degree of probability, result in harm to another.73
Much litigation surrounds this requirement and whether a co-employees’ actions
constitute willful and wanton misconduct.74 However, the court has attempted to
tackle willful and wanton misconduct by showing what it is not, instead of stating
what it is.75

69

See supra Part I.

See Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, ¶ 16, 67 P.3d 627, 633 (Wyo. 2003). Although
not clear, it seems the court in Bertagnolli equates the willful requirement with the third element,
“willful disregard of the need to act despite the awareness of the high probability that serious injury
or death may result.” Id.
70

71

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (2015).

72

See Bertagnolli, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d at 632.

Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Wyo. 1986); see also Mayflower Restaurant Co.
v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1987). The court clarified that it is not an intent to cause the
injury; rather, the intent to do an act, or an intent not to do an act. See Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188,
191 (citing Mitchell v. Walters, 100 P.2d 102 (Wyo. 1940)).
73

74
See, e.g., Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1995); Bettencourt v. Pride Well
Serv., Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987); Loredo v. Solvay Am. Inc., 2009 WY 93, 212 P.3d 614
(Wyo. 2009); Formisano v. Gaston, 2011 WY 8, 246 P.3d 286 (Wyo. 2011).
75

See Smith, 893 P.2d at 714.
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In distinguishing willful misconduct from ordinary negligence, the actor’s
state of mind is determinative.76 The court—understanding that state of mind is
often difficult to establish and prove—stated:
In order to prove that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct,
one must demonstrate that he acted with a state of mind that
approaches intent to do harm. State of mind, of course, may be
difficult to prove. Accordingly, courts allow a party to establish
that willful misconduct has occurred by demonstrating that an
actor has intentionally committed an act of unreasonable character
in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it
highly probable that harm will follow.77
At first glance, it may seem that the court has relaxed the statutory standard,
but, in reviewing the case law, the court remains stringent in its application.78
For example, willful misconduct is not evinced when a co-employee obtains
knowledge of a dangerous condition and fails to correct it;
[w]illful misconduct does not arise merely from “a thoughtless,
heedless, or inadvertent act, or an error in judgment,” it is “more
than mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement or
confusion . . . it is “an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a
situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.”79
The court has had a multitude of opportunities to determine which actions
constitute willful and wanton misconduct and which actions fall short.80 The
court has determined that falling asleep at the wheel while transporting a fellow
employee home, despite working fifty-three hours straight, does not rise to the
level of willful and wanton misconduct.81 The court clarified that even though
the driver could have avoided these long hours, the conduct fails to rise to the level
of willful and wanton misconduct.82 The court has also held that a co-employee’s
76

See id.

77

Id. (emphasis added).

78

See Formisano, ¶¶ 12–16, 246 P.3d at 290; Loredo, ¶ 17, 212 P.3d at 627.

79

Loredo, ¶ 17, 212 P.3d at 627–28 (quoting Smith, 893 P.2d at 714) (emphasis added).

See, e.g., Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, 67 P.3d 627 (Wyo. 2003); Case v. Goss,
776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989); Loredo, 2009 WY 93, 212 P.3d 614; Van Patten v. Gipson, 2011 WY
98, 253 P.3d 505 (Wyo. 2011); Formisano, 2011 WY 8, 246 P.3d 286.
80

81
Formisano, ¶ 28, 246 P.3d at 293. The injured employee argued that Gaston “intentionally
drove while ‘sleep deprived,’” which constitutes approach to do harm. Id. ¶ 22, 246 P.3d at 292.
82
See id. ¶ 26, 246 P.3d at 293 (“Being tired, but ‘feeling okay,’ Gaston got in the driver’s
seat after a long day’s work, intending to drive home to Gillette, less than two hours away. Even
assuming that some of the late hours of work could have been avoided by Gaston, we do not see this
conduct as meeting the test for co-employee liability under the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation
Act. While there certainly was some possibility of Gaston falling asleep and causing an accident,
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violation of a company policy, which leads to the injury, is not enough to rise to
the level of willful and wanton misconduct.83 Similarly, the court has held that a
co-employee need not act immediately to solve an issue regarding a defective or
problematic piece of equipment.84 Finally, the court has emphasized that mere
safety violations are not enough to rise to willful misconduct.85
Given the history outlined above, it appears that the Wyoming Supreme
Court and the state legislature want to limit the number of co-employee liability
cases.86 The case law surrounding co-employee liability requires a fact-intensive,
often frustrating, initial consultation with a client who seeks remediation for
injuries sustained as a result of an ignorant and dangerous co-employee.87 Often,
a client can leave the initial consultation even more confused and without clear
answers about whether his or her claim holds merit.88
Re-examining Example 1, the issue is whether Chad intentionally acted, or
failed to act, in reckless disregard of the consequences. Chad’s conduct must be an
extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care and it must be in a situation
where a high degree of danger is apparent.89 Given these standards, it is unlikely
that Chad acted with a state of mind “approaching intent to do harm.”90 There

we cannot say that Gaston intentionally acted to cause physical harm to Fromisano, or that these
circumstances were such ‘that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know, that such
conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in harm to another.’”).
See Van Patten, ¶¶ 24–31, 253 P.3d at 511–12. Evidence was also presented that the injured
employee had no reason to believe the other employee’s intended him harm by using the manrider
to release the tugger line and that if the co-employees believed the manrider to open the storm gate
was unsafe, they would not have done so. See id.
83

84
See Loredo, ¶¶ 17–18, 212 P.3d at 629. In Loredo v. Solvay Am. Inc., the plaintiff ’s super
visor was aware the plaintiff ’s work as a mine roof bolter took the plaintiff through unbolted parts
of the mine and knew that the bolter’s tramming functions were off. See id. The court determined
that the defendant adhered to the mine’s roof bolting plan and he agreed to have the bolter fixed
during the down-shift. Moreover, the court made much ado about the fact that the defendant never
threatened to fire the plaintiff about complaining. See id.
85
See Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 715–16 (Wyo. 1995) (“Appellant, in attempting
to demonstrate [appellee’s] alleged culpable negligence, relies heavily on violations of OSHA
regulations concerning safety training and equipment. While these asserted violations may constitute
evidence of ordinary negligence, they do not demonstrate a state of mind consistent with culpable
negligence, which requires knowledge or obviousness of a high probability of harm.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).
86

See supra notes 70–84 and accompanying text.

87

See supra notes 70–84 and accompanying text.

As seen in the cases cited, there is rarely “a smoking gun” found. This, coupled with the
fact that these clients are often on the brink of bankruptcy and could be severely disfigured or have
unseen severe internal injuries, can take an emotional toll on both the lawyer and the client.
88

89

See supra Part I; see also Smith, 893 P.2d 712; Loredo, ¶ 17, 212 P.3d at 627–28.

90

See Smith, 893 P.2d at 714.
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are no facts that show Chad was intentionally acting to harm Peter.91 Although
Chad was likely aware that, by doing his job, Peter would be protected and the
accident may not have occurred as it did, his failure to act is unlikely to rise above
the standard of ordinary negligence. Much like the cases above, the court would
likely be reserved in finding co-employee liability in this specific case. In fact, this
case is very similar to Formisano v. Gaston.92 In that case, and particularly relevant
here, the court stated that
[w]hile there certainly was some possibility of Gaston falling
asleep and causing an accident, we cannot say that Gaston
intentionally acted to cause physical harm to Formisano, or that
these circumstances were such “that a reasonable person would
know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a
high degree of probability, result in harm to another.”93
Looking at the key words, “intentionally” and “high degree of probability,” it
seems that Chad’s conduct would fall short in the third element and thus, no
co-employee liability would be available.

III. Workers’ Compensation Claim for Future Medical Expenses
Although Chad’s conduct likely falls short of “willful and wanton mis
conduct,” a jury could determine that Chad was negligent.94 Thus, the remainder
of this article will assume such and discuss the repercussions of a negligence
determination and its interplay with the Workers’ Compensation system. The
first issue is the concept of future medical expenses and coverage of the same in
Workers’ Compensation.

A. The Statute is Unclear as to Whether or Not the Division of Workers’
Compensation Can Be Reimbursed for Future Medical Bills
As provided in Example 1, and common in the personal injury practice
realm, future medical expenses are speculative but, nevertheless, are collectible in
tort claims.95 However, due to the speculative nature of future medical expenses,

91

See supra Part I.

92

Compare supra Part I, with Formisano v. Gaston, 2011 WY 8, 246 P.3d 286 (Wyo. 2011).

93

Formisano, ¶ 26, 246 P.3d at 293 (emphasis added).

It is important to note that if the jury finds Chad negligent, Peter will be unable to collect
from him due to the exclusive remedy rule.
94

95
See supra Part I; see also Wyo. Const. art. X, § 4(a) (“No law shall be enacted limiting
the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person.”); Rudy v.
Bossard, 997 P.2d 480, 485 (Wyo. 2000) (stating, “[w]e conclude that this evidence was sufficient
to warrant allowing the jury to consider the issue of Sharon’s future medical expenses.”).
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the question remains: Does Workers’ Compensation have a right to collect
a portion of the future medical expenses? The statute is equally unclear.96 The
pertinent part provides:
[I]f the employee recovers from the third party or the coemployee
in any manner including judgment, compromise, settlement or
release, the state is entitled to be reimbursed for all payments
made, or to be made, to or on behalf of the employee under this
act but not to exceed one-third (1/3) of the total proceeds of the
recovery without regard to the types of damages alleged in the
third-party action.97
This language could imply future medical expenses, but it could also imply
payments for incurred medical expenses, temporary total disability, permanent
partial disability, or permanent disability that have yet to be paid.98 Under the
plain language of the statute, it is ambiguous whether or not the phrase “or to be
made” includes future medical care.99
Given that the statute is ambiguous, the various canons of construction must
be utilized to interpret and understand the statute. In doing so, one must use
the conflicting canons of construction, specifically in pari materia and ejusdem
generis.100 The employee would assert the canon in pari materia, requesting the
court to look at the statute as a whole to determine whether or not the phrase
“to be made” includes future medical care.101 In so arguing, the employee would

96

See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105 (2015).

97

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a) (emphasis added).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102 (defining the various benefits available to employees
injured while on the job); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-401 to -408 (2015) (the Workers’
Compensation statutes on employee benefits).
98

99

In explaining statutory interpretation, the United States Supreme Court stated:
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought
in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is
within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
100

See infra notes 101–12 and accompanying text.

See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, ¶ 40, 65 P.3d 720, 733–34 (2003). In
Crow the Wyoming Supreme Court described the overall interpretation of statutes when it stated:
101

Our standard of review with respect to the construction of statutes is well known.
In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature’s
intent. All statutes must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the
meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the
same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Statutory
construction is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo. We
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature’s intent. We begin
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point to subsections (e) and (f ) of the statute in asserting his or her claim that
the Division of Workers’ Compensation is not entitled to future medical costs.102
In both subsections, the statute states: “From any amounts recovered under this
subsection, the state is entitled to an amount equal to all sums awarded as benefits
to the employee or his estate, all anticipated future medical costs and all costs of
litigation.”103 Because the legislature chose to use the phrase “all anticipated future
medical costs” in subsections (e) and (f ), it could be argued, under the canon in
pari materia, that the legislature omitted the phrase in subsection (a) and chose to
use “to be made” purposefully.104 The legislature purposefully distinguished “to be
made” from “all anticipated future medical costs,” indicating its intent to exclude
future medical costs from recovery.105 Additionally, subsections (e) and (f ) involve
the Division of Workers’ Compensation bringing the claim on the employee’s
behalf.106 Therefore, a rational argument could be made that the Division of
Workers’ Compensation is not entitled to future medical expenses.107
The Division of Workers’ Compensation would claim that the legislative
intent behind the statute is to reimburse or subrogate Workers’ Compensation for
amounts paid.108 In addition to arguing legislative intent, the Division of Workers’
by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words
employed according to their arrangement and connection. We construe the statute
as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe
all parts of the statute in pari materia. When a statute is sufficiently clear and
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Moreover, we must not give
a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another
interpretation.
Id. (citations omitted).
102

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(e)–(f ).

103

Id. (emphasis added).

See Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶ 28, 64 P.3d 104, 113 (Wyo. 2003) (stating, “[w]e are
not, however, free to ignore any word that the legislature has chosen to place in a statute, and every
word is presumed to have a meaning.”).
104

105

Id.

106

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(e)–(f ).

Of course, in some instances this argument would be irrelevant, such as those circumstances
triggering the part of the statute where the state’s recovery cannot “exceed one-third (1/3) of the
total proceeds of the recovery without regard to the types of damages alleged in the third-party
action.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a).
107

108

See Streeter v. Amerequip Corp., 968 F. Supp. 624, 629 (D. Wyo. 1997) stating:
The clear language of the Worker’s Compensation Act demonstrates that
the purpose of the act is to assure quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and
medical benefits to injured and disabled workers at reasonable cost to employers.
The act provides for mutual renunciation of common law rights by both employees
and employers.
. . . One of the significant provisions of the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation
Act, § 27-14-105(b) set out above, is designed to protect the state’s lien rights,
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Compensation could also use the canon ejusdem generis.109 As previously stated, the
phrase “to be made” is ambiguous in the statute.110 Under the concept of ejusdem
generis, future medical payments could be included in a Workers’ Compensation
subrogation lien, if one: (1) reviews the entirety of the statute; (2) looks at the
intent of the legislature; (3) understands that “to be made” indicates a future
action; and (4) future medicals being referenced in sections wherein the State of
Wyoming brings a suit on the employee’s behalf.111 Given the legislative intent
behind Wyoming Statute section 27-14-105 and ejusdem generis, the Division of
Workers’ Compensation would be well within its confines to argue it is entitled
to future medical payments. Yet, the plain language coupled with in pari materia,
as well as the Division’s ability to deny future coverage, suggest a limit on the
Division’s ability to collect on future medical coverage.112

B. If the Statute Does Allow for Future Medicals, the Division Should Not
Be Allowed to Deny Coverage of Future Benefits
As previously stated, the Division of Workers’ Compensation would
predictably argue that future medical expenses are included in order to ensure
that they are recompensed for payments “to be made” to the employee.113 If it is
determined that future medical expenses are included, the consequences could
extend to other statutes, rules, and regulations.114 For example, on any claim
for medical or hospital care, the Division of Workers’ Compensation “may
approve or deny payment of all or portions of the entire amount claimed . . . .”115

in the event of a settlement or judgment in favor of the injured worker in an
action involving third parties or others. The provisions requiring notice to the
Department of Employment and the Attorney General are designed to provide
a mechanism that will ensure preservation of the State of Wyoming’s lien rights.
The failure to ensure that the State receives notice that enables the State to protect
its rights of reimbursement and preserve lien rights may have consequences that
were never intended by the employee, employer or third party who enters into
a settlement of a personal injury case, as described in the statute. The primary
beneficiary of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-105 is the State of Wyoming.
109
See DiFelici v. City of Lander, 2013 WY 141, ¶ 15, 312 P.3d 816, 821 (Wyo. 2013) (“The
principle of ejusdem generis tells us that ‘general words, [associated with] an enumeration of words
with specific meanings, should be construed to apply to the same general kind or class as those
specifically listed.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
110

See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a), (e), (f ). In pari materia and ejusdem generis are not
interdependent in this respect.
111

112
See supra notes 95–111 and accompanying text. The Division’s ability to deny coverage is
covered in depth in the next section. See infra Part III.B.
113

See supra notes 95–111 and accompanying text.

114

E.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601 (2015).

115

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(b).
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Additionally, if a future surgery is recovered in the lawsuit, the Division of Workers’
Compensation could still deny preauthorization for the surgery.116 Certainly, the
argument against Workers’ Compensation being able to deny benefits is premised
upon the Division of Workers’ Compensation collecting future medical expenses.
It should be irrelevant as to what is ultimately collected in the lawsuit for purposes
of future medical expenses because the current statute both defines and confines
Workers’ Compensation’s subrogated claim.117 Under the statute, the Division
of Workers’ Compensation may deny the future medical benefits, deeming the
benefits as “not necessary” or “not caused by the accident.”118 Denial would not
preclude the employee from seeking treatment by or through his or her medical
insurance coverage. If the Division of Workers’ Compensation is allowed to
recover on future medicals, then the Division of Workers’ Compensation should
be precluded from denying future coverage. Otherwise, Workers’ Compensation
is utilizing the statute as both a shield (i.e., reaping the benefits of collecting
future medicals in a third party claim) and a sword (i.e., denying the same as “not
necessary” or “not caused by the accident”).

IV. Attorney’s Fees—The Arbitrary Percentage
Third-party liability claims with the underlying medical bills and lost wages
paid by Workers’ Compensation will vary in the different types of contingency

116

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(o) (laying out the requirements for preauthorization).
The division pursuant to its rules and regulations may issue a determination of
preauthorization for an injured worker’s nonemergency hospitalization, surgery or
other specific medical care, subject to the following:
(i) The division’s determination that the worker suffered a compensable injury is
final and not currently subject to contested case or judicial review;
(ii) A claim for preauthorization is filed by a health care provider on behalf of the
injured worker;
(iii) The division’s determination pursuant to this subsection is issued in
accordance with the procedures provided in subsection (k) of this section;
(iv) Following a final determination to preauthorize, the necessity of the
hospitalization, surgery or specific medical care shall not be subject to
further review and providers’ bills shall be reviewed only for relatedness
to the preauthorized care and reasonableness in accord with the division’s
fee schedules.

Id.
117
Readers of this article are likely shouting at the writers saying, “You just told me that
the statute is ambiguous,” to which the response is, “You are right, however, the statute limits
the Division of Workers’ Compensation to one-third of total recovery, and the statute is clear in
that respect.”

See Rules, Regulations and Fees Schedules of the Wyoming Workers’ Safety
Compensation Division, § 1; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(o).
118
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fee agreements entered into by an injured party and an attorney.119 The Wyoming
Legislature anticipated the varying degrees of attorney’s fees when it enacted the
statute at issue: “Any recovery by the state shall be reduced pro rata for attorney fees
and costs in the same proportion as the employee is liable for fees and costs.”120 If
that is not arbitrary enough, “[t]he attorney general and the director, for purposes
of facilitating compromise and settlement, may in a proper case authorize
acceptance by the state of less than the state’s claim for reimbursement.”121 The
statute bases the attorney’s fees on the term “recovery,” which is limited to onethird of the total recovery.122
Cases involving Workers’ Compensation can be quite complex as to liability
and even require parties to follow special guidelines when initiating a lawsuit.123
This allows attorneys, knowing the risks that may be encountered, to take cases

Attorney’s fees vary among practicing attorneys, and the Rules Governing Contingent Fees
for Members of the Wyoming State Bar allow for varying fees, restricting the fees to a “reasonableness”
standard. Rule 5(f ) of the Rules Governing Contingent Fees for Members of the Wyoming State Bar
provide the following factors in determining reasonableness of the contingency fee:
119

In its determination of the reasonableness of the fee, upon review, the committee
may consider as applicable the following criteria:
(1) the amount of costs incurred or advanced by the attorney in representing
the client;
(2) the time and labor required;
(3) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(4) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(5) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the attorney;
(6) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(7) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to
the client;
(8) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(9) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(10) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys
performing the services; and
(11) the contingency or the certainty of the compensation.
Wyo. Ct. R. 5(f ), https://perma.cc/ZQR7-68GF.
120

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a) (2015).

121

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b).

122

See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105.

123
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b) (requiring any party bringing a claim under
Wyoming Statue section 27-14-105(a) to send the complaint to the director of Wyoming Workers’
Compensation Division and the Attorney General by certified mail return receipt requested in order
for a court to have jurisdiction over the case).
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on a higher contingency fee.124 Consequently, the injured party is able to shift
some of the burdens to the Division of Workers’ Compensation “in the same
proportion as the employee is liable for [attorney’s] fees and costs.”125 Certain
employees, while having to pay their attorney a higher fee percentage of the
total recovery, benefit more than others who have to pay the standard one-third
contingency fee, because the Division of Workers’ Compensation pays the same
percentage of the employee. If Workers’ Compensation is to be bound by the
contingency fee agreement entered into by the employee, the Division of Workers’
Compensation should be a party to the contract under the longstanding doctrine
of privity of contract; this may not necessarily be a workable solution for a
number of reasons.126 A more workable solution would be to disregard the contract
and to have the legislature set the percentage that Workers’ Compensation will
reduce their claim to account for the employee’s attorney’s fees, say, for example,
thirty-three and one-third percent (33.33%) or even forty percent (40%) to
account for the various difficulties that could arise in bringing these claims.
While the Division of Workers’ Compensation will reduce its subrogation
claim by accounting for the employee’s attorney’s fees, the legislature has given
the Division wide latitude in further reducing its claim in order to facilitate
“compromise and settlement.”127 Upon a plain reading of the statute, the
reduction of its subrogation claim can take place in any case. In cases involving
co-employee negligence, reducing the subrogation claim makes sense because the
Division of Workers’ Compensation can account for the negligence to provide
a more equitable outcome. In other circumstances, certain employees may get
better bargains, providing for a less equitable approach. The legislature intended
to be fair to employees who bring a third-party liability claim under the Workers’
Compensation statutes, as duly indicated by allowing for reduction by the
Division of Workers’ Compensation to account for the employee’s attorney’s fees
as well as allowing reduction of its subrogation claim in order to promote the
settlement of a claim.128 Yet, the statute is too broad and should be narrowly
tailored to limit the circumstances in which the Division of Workers’
Compensation reduces its claim, such as circumstances involving co-employee
or employer negligence. The result would be a more equitable result to all

See supra note 119 and accompanying text (wherein the factors “the time and labor
required,” “the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,” “the contingency or the certainty
of the compensation,” among others, can justify the higher contingency fee).
124

125

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a).

See Larsen v. Sjogren, 226 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1951) (stating “[t]he parties to a contract are
the ones to complain of a breach, and if they are satisfied with the disposition which has been
made of it, and of all claims under it, a third party has no right to insist that it has been broken.”
(citation omitted)).
126

127

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b).

128

See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a)–(b).
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employees. In conclusion, the attorney’s fees provisions of Wyoming Statute
section 27-14-105 should be more precisely drafted to provide fairness to
employees across the board.

V. Conclusion
A. The Subrogation Statute as It Currently Functions, and How It
Should Function
The subrogation statute becomes even more muddled, and perhaps completely
unfair, when we factor in co-employee liability and the Wyoming Workers’
Compensation Division’s ability to subrogate on these claims. Thus, we will
conclude by using the facts in Example 1 to show how Workers’ Compensation
is likely to subrogate its claim, discuss the unfairness of that scenario, and provide
what we believe is a workable solution to this unfairness that takes both the
Division’s interests and the employees’ interests into account.129

1. Outcome 1: Plain Reading of the Statute
As a quick review, Peter’s case goes to a jury trial. The jury awards total
damages of $900,000.00. The jury specifies the damages as follows:
(1) $300,000.00 for medical costs and lost wages; (2) $100,000.00 in future
medicals bills; and (3) $500,000.00 for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment
of life, and permanent disability.
The jury apportions fault as follows:
Darryl:
Chad:
Peter:

50% (or $450,000.00)
50% (negligence, not willful and wanton misconduct)
0%

Workers’ Compensation is limited to one-third of the total recovery.130 In
this scenario, Peter is going to recover only $450,000.00 of the $900,000.00
judgment based upon Darryl’s negligence and because Chad was a negligent
co-employee who likely would not reach the level of willful and wanton
misconduct. Thus, under the Workers’ Compensation statutes and foregoing
case law, Peter cannot collect from Chad. Remember, Workers’ Compensation
has a $400,000.00 subrogation claim. However, Workers’ Compensation will be
limited to $150,000.00 of its $400,000.00 based upon the statutory limitation

129

See supra Part I; see also infra notes 130–44 and accompanying text.

130

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a).
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of one-third of the total recovery.131 From that, Workers’ Compensation should
reduce its amount pro rata by attorney’s fees.132 Assuming a standard one-third
contingency fee agreement and that Workers’ Compensation applies it to the
reduced portion ($150,000.00) rather than off the top of its entire subrogation lien
($400,000.00), Workers’ Compensation would walk away with $100,000.00.133
Peter would walk away from a $900,000.00 judgment with $200,000.00 in his
pocket and future medical bills of $100,000.00.134

2. Outcome 2: The Undeterminable Fault Settlement
In the previous outcome, fault was determinable, so subrogation claims and the
amount recovered can be reduced proportionately. Because this is a settlement, it
is impossible for a determination of fault without some independent body to make
a determination.135 Therefore, if a settlement occurs between Peter and Trucking
Industries, LLC, the amount of subrogation should be limited to the statutory
one-third and then reduced by the statutory attorneys’ fees and costs.136 Also, in
the event of settlement, the Division of Workers’ Compensation is permitted by
statute to be present, and may accept less in order to facilitate settlement.137 This
would allow the employee and the third-party to claim comparative fault in order

See generally id. Of course, Workers’ Compensation will argue for $100,000.00 for future
medicals or a total lien of $500,000.00 but, again, the legislature chose the phrase “to be made”
instead of the “all anticipated future medical costs” used in sections (e) and (f ). Based upon the facts
set forth, Workers’ Compensation’s claim for future medicals would prove to be moot, but upon
the appropriate factual circumstances, it could be a substantial factor in determining the amount of
Workers’ Compensation lien.
131

132

See generally id.

The $100,000.00 represents $150,000.00 (the total recovery as presented) less pro rata
attorney’s fees of one-third ($50,000.00).
133

134
The $200,000.00 stems from $150,000.00 to the attorney in this matter, based upon a
one-third contingency fee, and $100,000.00 to the Division of Workers’ Compensation.
135
The authors played with the idea of creating an independent body to make a decision in a
limited forum, but determined that defense counsel would have very little incentive to provide for
a defense as they have already agreed to pay a sum certain. Additionally, the defendant would have
no incentive to provide testimony to assist in determining fault, and the defendant would be one
of the few individuals with first-hand knowledge and testimony regarding the case. Lastly, Workers’
Compensation could present their side as to the comparative fault, but ultimately the legislature has
provided Workers’ Compensation significant flexibility in resolving matters. See infra note 138 and
accompanying text.
136

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a).

137

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b), which provides as follows:
If there is a settlement, compromise or release entered into by the parties in claims
against a person other than the employer, the attorney general representing the
director shall be made a party in all such negotiations for settlement, compromise
or release. The attorney general and the director, for purposes of facilitating
compromise and settlement, may in a proper case authorize acceptance by the
state of less than the state’s claim for reimbursement.
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to reduce the subrogation claim with Workers’ Compensation.138 However, the
legislature has provided no framework for those arguing to reduce the Workers’
Compensation subrogation claim, which ultimately leaves it up to an arbitrary
decision maker as to the final potential resolution.

3. Altering “Outcome 1: Plain Reading of the Statute” to Provide
a Conservative Approach with Fault Apportioned and a More
Equitable Remedy
Under the plain language of the statute, Workers’ Compensation gets a
windfall. From an insurance standpoint, it was able to provide immunity to
the employer/co-employee and still able to collect on its subrogation lien. In
our example, it was able to provide immunity of $450,000.00 and still receive
$150,000.00 of reimbursed costs. While Workers’ Compensation did receive
a reduced amount because the statute provides that subrogation is based upon
“gross recovery” and not “gross judgment,” Workers’ Compensation’s claim to the
“gross recovery” was not reduced by the apportioned fault.139
The statute should be written to take into account the negligence of the people
covered by Workers’ Compensation. This proposal would ultimately be more
equitable to the employee and emphasize the basic concepts of insurance. In this
example, Peter cannot collect from Chad because of the co-employee immunity
exception for willful and wanton conduct.140 Thus, Workers’ Compensation has
shielded $450,000.00 from judgment.141 With only $450,000.00 to recover—
under a standard comparative fault analysis—Workers’ Compensation should be
reduced to subrogation of only half of that amount because of Chad’s comparative
negligence.142 Accordingly, Workers’ Compensation should only be able to collect
on a $225,000.00 gross recovery figure.143 With the limitation of one-third of the
total gross recovery, Workers’ Compensation can collect $75,000.00, less its pro

138
While it appears that the third party would not care if Workers’ Compensation should be
subrogated a lesser amount, the third party has an interest in apportioning as much fault as possible
on the co-employee in order to reduce the overall settlement.

For example, Workers’ Compensation claim was reduced from $900,000.00 to $450,000.00
based upon the apportioned fault of fifty percent (50%) to Darryl and fifty percent (50%) to Chad.
However, Workers’ Compensation does not have to reduce the apportioned fault from the gross
recovery, just from the gross judgment. These are merely interpretations of the statute because the
statute does not provide for comparative negligence claims.
139

140

See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104 (2015).

141

See id.

142

See generally id.

$450,000.00 divided by fifty percent (50%), as determined by the jury, for a total of
$225,000.00 gross recovery.
143
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rata share of attorneys’ fees and costs.144 In this scenario, Workers’ Compensation
walks away with one-half of what it received in Outcome 1, which accounts
for the jury’s allocation of Chad’s negligence. This proposed adjustment to the
Workers’ Compensation subrogation lien in third-party liability claims allows for
fairness to the employee in matters involving negligence by co-employees that
takes into account the heightened “willful and wanton misconduct” standard.

B. Parting Thoughts on Future Development in This Area of Law
The Division of Workers’ Compensation is able to utilize the statutes, as
written, as a shield (blocking claims of co-employee liability in negligence actions)
and a sword (subrogating the claim without respect to comparative fault and
denying future benefits). It is possible that the legislature attempted to remedy
this situation by limiting subrogation recovery in third-party actions brought by
a covered employee to one-third of the total recovery, as well as allowing for the
reduction of fees in order to promote settlement. In our opinion, the legislature
did a sufficient job in articulating a statute that can revolve very fact-dependent
scenarios. That being said, the statute does have inherent ambiguity and unfairness.
The legislature should do three things to provide clarity for Wyoming
Statute section 27-14-105. First, the legislature needs to take into account
co-employee negligence. Arguably the legislature did this by limiting recovery
to one-third of the total recovery, but that limitation should be further reduced
by the comparative negligence of a co-employee due to the mere fact that the
co-employee was indemnified for his or her actions. Second, the legislature needs
to clarify whether or not future medical expenses are included in the Workers’
Compensation subrogation claim. If the legislature determines that future
medical expenses are includable in a Workers’ Compensation subrogation lien,
then Workers’ Compensation should be prevented from denying future benefits
to the employee. Finally, the legislature needs to set the percentage that a Workers’
Compensation’s subrogation claim is reduced, so all employees are treated the
same by Workers’ Compensation. The set percentage should be independent of
the amount of attorney’s fees agreed to by the employee. The legislature has been
gratuitous in allowing the Division of Workers’ Compensation to reduce its claim
to promote settlement, but the legislature should narrow the circumstances in
which the Division may do so (i.e., in the event of co-employee liability). If the
legislature takes these actions, fairness to employees and a clearer framework for
practicing lawyers will result.

144

$75,000.00 less one-third (1/3) on a presumed contingency fee for a total of $50,000.00.
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